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On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"),1 the
most sweeping bankruptcy reform legislation passed by Congress in over a
2 3quarter of a century. The bill, which spanned over 600 pages, completely
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for his invaluable research assistance and to the helpful comments from the bank-
ruptcy symposium participants in "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Bankruptcy Re-
form," held at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law on February 24-
25, 2006.
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485 (2005)
("Although its genesis can be traced to the formation of a commission charged by
Congress with a modest mandate to review the state of the bankruptcy law and sys-
tem, the end product represents one of the most comprehensive overhauls of the
Bankruptcy Code in more than twenty-five years."); Bruce C. Scalambrino, The
Bankruptcy Reform for Non-Bankruptcy Lawyers, 93 ILL. B.J. 518, 518 (2005) ("The
new law makes the most sweeping changes to bankruptcy law since the 1978 enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code .... "); Despite this fact, Congress considered the bill
for less than two months before passing it overwhelmingly. Mario A. Mata, Asset
Protection Techniques for Real Estate Owners, SL033 ALI-ABA 605, 611 (2005)
(After eight years of fierce debate and near misses, Congress finally
passes the most sweeping overall [overhaul] of bankruptcy law when, on
April 15, 2005, by a vote of 302-126, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005. The House vote came approximately one month after the Senate
voted 74-25 to pass the Bill. All proposed amendments to the proposed
legislation were summarily defeated in the House of Representatives as
part of a concerted effort to pass the legislation without any amendments
to the version passed by the Senate one month earlier.);
see also 151 CONG. REC. S1725-07 (Feb. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist).
3. See Ann D. Zeigler & Steven D. Shum, Major Changes Made to Business
Bankruptcy Practice: Critical Information the Occasional Practitioner Needs to
Know Now about the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Hous. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 38, 42.
HeinOnline  -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 879 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
overhauled the consumer bankruptcy system and made significant changes to
business bankruptcies as well.4 Yet despite Congress's massive effort to im-
prove the current bankruptcy system in BAPCPA, it failed to address a num-
ber of important issues in the area of bankruptcy taxation, a critical but often
overlooked area of bankruptcy law. 5 One such issue involves the tax conse-
quences of property abandonments in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The abandonment issue is best understood through an example. Assume
that a debtor owns three apartment complexes with a total value of $53 mil-
lion. The apartments' combined adjusted basis is $13 million; thus, there is a
$40 million taxable gain inherent in the buildings. The apartments are en-
cumbered by liens of nearly $60 million.6 The debtor files a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition and the bankruptcy trustee seeks to abandon the apartment
complexes as burdensome to the bankruptcy estate, because their liabilities
exceed their fair market value, leaving no value for the estate's unsecured
creditors. 7 In this example, the tax issue that arises is whether the trustee's
abandonment of the properties is a taxable or nontaxable transfer. If it is tax-
able, then by abandoning the apartment complexes, the bankruptcy trustee
triggers taxation of the complexes' built-in gain of $40 million to the bank-
ruptcy estate. If, on the other hand, the abandonment is not a taxable transfer,
then the $40 million gain inherent in the apartments will be taxable to the
debtor when he later transfers the property in a taxable transaction, most
likely to the secured creditor upon foreclosure.
8
4. See, e.g., Roger Cox, BAPCPA 2005: Changes Affecting Business Bankrupt-
cies, 68 TEX. B.J. 1012, 1012-16 (2005); Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli,
The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
603 (2005); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005); Joel B. Weinberg, DEBTOR BEWARE the New
Bankruptcy Law Eliminates the Bankruptcy Code's Prior Presumption in Favor of
Granting the Relief Sought by the Debtor, Los ANGELES LAw., Oct. 2005, at 22.
5. Only 20 of the 206 provisions of BAPCPA dealt with bankruptcy tax issues.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 124-34 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.). In fact, the last time that Congress systematically considered bankruptcy
taxation issues was in 1980, when it passed the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.);
see also Jack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 153, 154 (1995) ("[The interface between bankruptcy and tax presents
a plethora of issues, many of which are ignored in traditional bankruptcy literature.").
6. These are the slightly simplified facts of one of the leading cases in the aban-
donments area, In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 266-67 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
7. For a more comprehensive discussion of the requirements for abandonment,
see infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
8. A foreclosure of property is a realization event for tax purposes, triggering
the recognition of gain. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941).
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Because this issue has ramifications for both tax and bankruptcy law,
both the Tax Code9 and the Bankruptcy Code are relevant in resolving it. Yet,
while both statutes contain provisions that bear on the issue, neither statute
fully settles it. Similarly, the few courts that have considered the issue have
not reached any consensus on how to resolve it.'
0
Unlike issues such as means testing" and exemption planning,' 2 which
have received massive attention in both the media'
3 and academic journals, 14
the tax consequences of abandonments have garnered little attention in either
venue. Yet despite the fact that academics and the mass media alike have
9. All references in this Article to the Tax Code are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, unless specifically stated otherwise.
10. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases
bearing on the abandonment issue.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of means testing, see Eugene
R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(B), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231 (2005); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005).
12. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy
Amendments: A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397 (2005); see also 11
U.S.C. § 522(o)-(p) (Supp. V 2005). In fact, exemption planning has already been the
subject of a flurry of bankruptcy court cases in 2005. See In re McNabb, 326 B.R.
785, 788 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (The $125,000 homestead exemption limit of 11
U.S.C. § 522(p) applies only in those states that have not opted out of the federal
exemption scheme.); but see In re Virissimo, 332 B.R. 201, 205-06 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2005) (BAPCPA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the $125,000
cap of § 522(p) to apply equally to opt-out and non-opt-out states.); In re Kaplan, 331
B.R. 483, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (The § 522(p) cap applies to all states, includ-
ing those that have opted out of the federal exemption provisions.).
13. See, e.g., Amy Borrus & Anne Tergesen, Not Necessarily A Fresh Start on
October 1, Bankruptcy Will Get Tougher and Costlier. Here's What You Need To
Know, Bus. WK., July 11, 2005, at 84; Reni Gertner, What Does the New Bankruptcy
Law Have to Offer?, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Sept. 19, 2005, at 1-2; Richard Mullins,
Bankruptcy Filers Line Up As Deadline Looms, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 15, 2005, Na-
tion/World section, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 17134169; Terry Savage, Many
New Changes in Bankruptcy Laws, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 65; Lawrence
A. Young, et al., STANDARD & POOR'S THE REV. OF BANKING & FN. SERV., July 1,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12702701.
14. See, e.g., David W. Allard, Means Testing, Dismissal and Conversion Under
the New Law, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8 (Aug. 2005); G. Eric Brunstad Jr., The Inap-
plicability of "Means Testing" to Cases Converted to Chapter 7, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 1 (Nov. 2005); Richard M. Hynes, Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Politi-
cal Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19 (2004); David A.
Samole & David L. Rosendorf, Homestead Exemptions No Longer "Debtors' Para-
dise," 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (Jan. 2006); see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in
Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559,
615-20 (2001).
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virtually ignored the issue, 15 it is of enormous importance in the bankruptcy
arena. The issue of how property abandonments are treated for tax purposes
goes to the very core of the bankruptcy system by placing into direct conflict
the dual policy justifications upon which the system is built: providing a fresh
start to deserving debtors 16 while furnishing a fair and equitable distribution
to creditors.17
In 1996, the Commercial Law League of America embarked on an em-
pirical study to determine whether property abandonments in bankruptcy
proceedings had a measurable effect on the value of assets distributed to
creditors in Chapter 7 proceedings.' 8 The results were astonishing. The study
estimated that over $340,000,000 in assets were being abandoned by bank-
ruptcy trustees rather than being sold for the benefit of unsecured creditors
because the tax liability arising from the sales of those assets would have
been overly burdensome to debtors' bankruptcy estates.19 The Commercial
Law League study concluded that unsecured creditors "are being deprived of
a source of funds from which they could recoup some portion of the billions
lost each year to bankrupt debtors., 20 Similarly, a study of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in Richmond, Virginia, over a four-year period demonstrated that in
over ninety-seven percent of the cases studied that involved secured creditors,
the bankruptcy trustee abandoned at least some assets to either the debtor or a
secured creditor.
21
In an article published in the Minnesota Law Review in 2004, I proposed
a three-pronged solution to the bankruptcy abandonments issue.22 In that arti-
cle, I argued that because the debtor benefited from the appreciation inherent
15. For the most comprehensive discussion of the abandonments issue by an
academic, see Jack F. Williams, The Tax Consequences of Abandonment Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 13 (1994); see also Kenneth C. Weil, Effects of
Real Property Abandonments in Bankruptcy, 70 J. TAx'N 358 (1989).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086 (The fresh start allows debtors "to get out from under the debilitating
effects of too much debt .... The two most important aspects of the fresh start avail-
able under the bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to a
normal [life] and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts.").
17. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
18. Impact of Potential Capital Gain Taxes on the Sale of Assets in Bankruptcy
Cases, COM. L. BULL., May/June 1996, at 21 [hereinafter Impact]; see also Max G.
Moses, Proposal for Capital Gain Taxes and Bankruptcy Cases, 102 CoM. L.J. 219,
219-20 (1997). This study is discussed more fully in Michelle Amopol Cecil, Aban-
donments in Bankruptcy: Unifying Competing Tax and Bankruptcy Policies, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 723, 727-28, 754-58 (2004).
19. Moses, supra note 18, at 220; Impact, supra note 18, at 21.
20. Impact, supra note 18, at 21.
21. Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Vir-
ginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed Dur-
ing 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 312 (1988).
22. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 765-80.
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in the property before filing for bankruptcy, it should be the debtor who is
required to pay the tax on the fain that is built into the asset when the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is initiated. In addition, I proposed that, because a debtor
in bankruptcy may not have sufficient funds to pay the tax on the built-in gain
inherent in the asset upon filing, recognition of the gain should be postponed
until a later time. 24 By treating the gain as discharge of indebtedness in-
come, 25 the debtor will be able to postpone including the gain in income until
she has the ability to pay the resulting tax, usually upon a later disposition of
26the property. In the third prong of my proposal, I argued that the debtor
should be entitled to retain her tax attributes, which include her net operating
losses, capital loss carryovers, and tax credit carryovers, so that these tax
attributes could be used to offset the debtor's discharge of indebtedness in-
come that arises from the abandoned property.
27
After Abandonments in Bankruptcy was published in 2004, several aca-
demics and other tax experts asked how my proposal would deal with gain
accruing in an asset after the debtor files his bankruptcy petition.21 Should
post-petition appreciation be taxed to the debtor or to the bankruptcy estate?
Moreover, if it is the debtor who bears the burden of the tax on post-petition
gain, should all post-petition gain be treated as discharge of indebtedness
income, or only the gain that accrues until the termination of the bankruptcy
proceeding? It is these follow-up issues that this Article seeks to address. Part
II of this Article explores both the bankruptcy and tax provisions that bear on
the tax treatment of property abandonments in a bankruptcy proceeding. Part
III outlines in greater detail the three-pronged proposal, set forth in Aban-
23. Id. at 766-67; see also infra Part Ill.A. This article will be referred to herein-
after as Abandonments in Bankruptcy.
24. Cecil, supra note 18 at 767-77.; see also infra Part III.B.
25. For a comprehensive review of the concept of discharge of indebtedness
income, see infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text. The notion that the built-in
gain inherent in an asset abandoned by the trustee be treated as discharge of indebted-
ness income was first proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference in 1994. See
NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REvIEw PROJECT 89-91 (1994). The Report, how-
ever, failed to consider fundamental issues such as whether the bankruptcy estate or
the debtor should bear the burden of the debt discharge income. For a more complete
discussion of the Conference's Report, see Cecil, supra note 18, at 761-62.
26. Most often, the debtor pays the tax upon a disposition of the property, either
by selling the property to a third party or through foreclosure of the property by the
secured creditor. However, the debtor may pay tax on the gain at an earlier time if,
under the discharge of indebtedness rules, the debtor is required to reduce her net
operating losses by the amount of debt discharge income, thereby making those net
operating losses unavailable to reduce other income in the future. For a more compre-
hensive discussion of the discharge of indebtedness rules, see infra notes 61-74 and
accompanying text; see also Cecil, supra note 18, at 770-75.
27. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 777-80; see also infra Part HI.C.
28. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
2006]
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donments in Bankruptcy, resolving the bankruptcy abandonments issue. Fi-
nally, Part IV grapples with how post-petition gain should be treated for tax
purposes when that property becomes part of a debtor's bankruptcy estate.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS BEARING ON THE ABANDONMENT ISSUE
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy trustee to
abandon property that is burdensome to the bankruptcy estate or is otherwise
of inconsequential value to the estate. 29 The Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee
to use these abandonment powers in order to maximize the value of the estate,
and, hence, the payout to unsecured creditors. 3 Legislative history suggests
29. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 92 (1978), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878.
30. Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 458 (E.D. Va. 1993), afftd, 30
F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). In one recent bankruptcy case,
the court was faced with the issue of how the trustee's abandonment power was af-
fected by section 724 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for the subordination
of tax liens under certain circumstances. Grochocinski v. Laredo (In re Laredo), 334
B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2005). In Laredo, the debtors, a husband and wife, filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Id. at 404. Their home, which became property of the
estate, was encumbered by two consensual mortgage liens of $224,971.21 and
$25,000, as well as a secured I.R.S. tax lien of $114,842.07. Id. The trustee sought a
determination of the priority of these liens if the home was sold. Id. at 405.
Section 724 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the subordination of tax liens to
other claims under certain circumstances. It provides:
(b) Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a lien
that is not avoidable under this title. . . and that secures an allowed claim
for a tax, or proceeds of such property, shall be distributed--
(1) first, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such prop-
erty that is not avoidable under this title and that is senior to such tax lien;
(2) second, to any holder of a claim of a kind specified in section
507(a)(1). . . . 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3), 507(a)(4), 507(a)(5), 507(a)(6), or
507(a)(7) of this title, to the extent of the amount of such allowed tax
claim that is secured by such tax lien;
(3) third, to the holder of such tax lien, to any extent that such holder's al-
lowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien exceeds any amount dis-
tributed under paragraph (2) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such
property that is not avoidable under this title and that is junior to such tax
lien;
(5) fifth, to the holder of such tax lien, to the extent that such holder's al-
lowed claim secured by such tax lien is not paid under paragraph (3) of
this subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 724(b) (Supp. V 2005). In Laredo, the court first noted that the primary
policy justification for section 724 is to subordinate tax liens in order to further the
debtor's fresh start by favoring priority unsecured claimants, such as wage earners
[Vol. 71
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that the trustee can abandon property to any party with a possessory interest
in it. 31 Those parties with a possessory interest in the abandoned property
would include the debtor and, in some cases, a secured creditor. 32 If property
is abandoned by the trustee to the debtor, the abandonment is treated as relat-
ing back to the time that the case is commenced; as a result, title revests in the
debtor and, for bankruptcy purposes, it is treated as if the estate never owned
the property. 33 Once the trustee abandons property, however, the abandon-
ment is irrevocable, even if the abandonment decision was based on an erro-
neous undervaluation of the property.
34
and estate administration costs, over tax liens. 334 B.R. at 411-12. "The only parties
affected by the operation of § 724(b) are the priority claimants and the tax lien credi-
tors. The rights and claims of both senior and junior lienors and the holders of non-
priority unsecured claims are left undisturbed." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Bino's Inc.,
182 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1995)) (citation omitted). Accordingly, section
724 of the Bankruptcy Code has little, if any, effect on the abandonment issue be-
cause the trustee is generally seeking abandonment in order to enhance the value of
the bankruptcy estate for general unsecured creditors, who are unaffected by the spe-
cial distribution scheme established in section 724. Id. at 415.
31. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 92, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5878; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 377 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6333.
32. See Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Perry (In re Perry), 29 B.R. 787, 793
(D. Md. 1983), aftd, 729 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Popp, 166 B.R. 697, 700
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1993) (mem.).
33. In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 653 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991) (mem.) (citing Mason
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 163 (1977), affd, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). It
is important to note that the court retains jurisdiction over property that is abandoned.
Thus, the court retains the power to decide issues relating to violations of the auto-
matic stay and issues regarding the dischargeability of debts relating to the abandoned
property. See, e.g., Dunmore v. United States (In re Dunmore), 254 B.R. 761, 763
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000) (mem.).
34. See In re Tadlock, 338 B.R. 436, 439 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006); In re Brio
Ref., Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 490 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (mem.); see also 15 MYRON M.
SHEINFELD ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I TX2.03[1][b] [iv] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2005). There are, however, some courts that have
distinguished between a formal abandonment, when the trustee invokes her abandon-
ment power pursuant to section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code to abandon property back
to the debtor, and technical abandonment, in which the bankruptcy estate closes pre-
maturely and property remaining in the estate is abandoned to the debtor by operation
of law. See, e.g., In re Balonze, 336 B.R. 160 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); Neville v.
Harris, 192 B.R. 825 (D.N.J. 1996). In the technical abandonment scenario, several
courts have modified or revoked the abandonment once the case was reopened under
section 350(b). See, e.g., Balonze, 336 B.R. at 170; Neville, 192 B.R. at 832. The
trustee's right to abandon property is not absolute. For a comprehensive discussion of
judicial limitations imposed on the trustee's abandonment power, see Cecil, supra
note 18, at 732.
20061
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Most often, a trustee will abandon property as burdensome to the bank-
ruptcy estate when the property is encumbered by a liability that exceeds its
fair market value. 35 Consider the following example. A debtor files for bank-
ruptcy owning a printing press used in his trade or business with a fair market
value of $25,000, and subject to a valid, unavoidable lien of $30,000. In this
case, the trustee should abandon the printing press back to the debtor because
the lien exceeds the fair market value of the property, leaving no value in the
bankruptcy estate to benefit unsecured creditors. In addition, because the
debtor is entitled to take exemptions before any value in the bankruptcy estate
goes to unsecured creditors, even if the lien were only $20,000, if the debtor
is entitled to a $5,000 tool of the trade exemption under his state's exemption
statute, the trustee should still abandon the property as of inconsequential
value to the debtor's bankruptcy estate because the $20,000 lien, coupled
with the debtor's $5,000 exemption, consume the full $25,000 value of the
printing press, leaving no value to go into the bankruptcy estate for the bene-
fit of unsecured creditors.
One issue that has perplexed courts since the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978 is whether the trustee can use his power of abandonment
to avoid incurring income tax liability on built-in gains inherent in estate
property. 36 For example, assume that a debtor purchases Blackacre for
$10,000 in 1975. In 2004, the debtor, an airplane mechanic, is laid off from
her job because of economic distress in the airline industry. At the time of her
layoff, Blackacre is worth $70,000. She borrows $60,000 from a local bank to
make ends meet, using Blackacre as collateral for the loan. Unfortunately, as
bills continue to mount with no prospects of employment in sight, the debtor
is forced to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in 2005, with Blackacre
becoming property of the estate by operation of law. The trustee attempts to
abandon Blackacre as burdensome to the estate, arguing that, if the trustee
were to sell the property instead of abandoning it, after the secured creditor's
$60,000 claim is paid, the $10,000 of remaining equity would be insufficient
to pay income taxes on the $60,000 gain inherent in the property.
Courts that have considered this issue have reached conflicting results,
largely because the provisions of the Tax Code governing the tax conse-
quences of abandonments do not squarely address the issue.37 Thus, it is nec-
essary to examine the relevant provisions of the Tax Code.
Under the Tax Code, gain inherent in property is not recognized, or in-
cluded in a taxpayer's gross income, until there is a realization event, which
is loosely defined as a sale or other disposition of the property.38 The amount
35. See, e.g., In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) (mem.).
36. For a comprehensive discussion of the conflicting case law on this issue, see
Cecil, supra note 18, at 737-48.
37. See, e.g., In re A. J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 267-74 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991); but see Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991); see also
infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
38. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2000).
[Vol. 71
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of gain that a taxpayer must include in gross income at that time is equal to
the difference between her amount realized on the sale or disposition and her
adjusted basis in the property.39 Case law has established that realization
events include the transfer of property to pay off a liability,40 an abandonment
41 42
of property, and a secured creditor's foreclosure of property. These gen-
eral income tax rules apply equally if a trustee sells or otherwise disposes of a
debtor's property while it is part of the bankruptcy estate, either through a
sale of the property43 or through foreclosure by a secured creditor. 44 The issue
that remains unresolved, however, is whether an abandonment by the trustee
during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding is considered a realization
event for tax purposes.
The Tax Code deals only briefly with the tax consequences of transfers
into and out of the bankruptcy estate. 45 Section 1398 of the Tax Code pro-
vides that "[a] transfer (other than by sale or exchange) of an asset from the
debtor to the estate shall not be treated as a disposition for purposes of any
provision of this title assigning tax consequences to a disposition. 46 Thus,
when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition and his pre-petition property is
transferred to the bankruptcy estate by operation of law, the transfer is not
treated as a sale or other disposition for income tax purposes; therefore, the
debtor realizes no gain or loss upon filing a bankruptcy petition.
Similarly, the Tax Code provides that "[iln the case of a termination of
the estate, a transfer (other than by sale or exchange) of an asset from the
estate to the debtor shall not be treated as a disposition for purposes of any
provision of this title assigning tax consequences to a disposition. 47 There-
fore, upon the termination of the estate at the close of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, any property remaining in the estate that reverts back to the debtor
by operation of law will not trigger a realization event. Thus, the estate will
not be taxed on any gain or loss inherent in estate property at the time of the
39. Id. § 1001(a). Case law has held that amount realized includes both recourse
liabilities assumed by the purchaser, as well as nonrecourse liabilities attached to the
property. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1983); Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
40. See Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943).
41. See Yarbro v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 479, 486 (5th Cir. 1984); Middleton v.
Comm'r, 77 T.C. 310, 320-21 (1981), affid, 693 F.2d 124 (11th Cir 1982) (per cu-
riam).
42. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-12 (1941).
43. See Waldschmidt v. Comm'r (In re Lambdin), 33 B.R. 11, 12-13 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983) (mem); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), as reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852.
44. See Williams, supra note 15, at 40-41.
45. The following two paragraphs are taken in substantial part from Cecil, supra
note 18, at 736-37.
46. I.R.C. § 1398(0(1) (2000).
47. Id. § 1398(f)(2).
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reversion. It is unclear, however, whether an abandonment of property by
the trustee back to the debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding constitutes a
transfer for tax purposes, and case law on the issue reaches conflicting re-
sults.
49
III. RESOLVING THE BANKRUPTCY ABANDONMENT ISSUE
In Abandonments in Bankruptcy, I argued in favor of adopting a three-
pronged approach to the bankruptcy abandonment issue.50 Because the unre-
solved issues addressed in Part IV of this article expand upon this approach,
this section outlines the three-pronged solution briefly to provide necessary
background.
A. Treating Abandonments As Non-Taxable Events
First, I contended that the debtor, and not the bankruptcy estate, should
be responsible for paying the tax on any pre-petition appreciation in an asset,
because the non-tax benefits arising out of that appreciation accrued to the
debtor before bankruptcy. 51 For example, the debtor was able to use and en-
joy the asset before filing, and he also had the ability to use the appreciation
in that asset as collateral for a loan, the proceeds from which could be used
for pleasure, investment, or to improve the debtor's business. 52 Traditional
notions of tax policy dictate that the party who enjoys a property's apprecia-
tion in value should pay the tax on that appreciation. 53 Thus, I argued that the
debtor should pay the tax resulting from pre-petition gain inherent in an asset,
irrespective of whether that asset is sold by the trustee, retained by the debtor
48. See, e.g., In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 899-900 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (mem.).
49. See, e.g., In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 269-75 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991) (holding that a trustee's abandonment was a taxable transfer, resulting in gain
to the bankruptcy estate); see also In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. D. Md.
1992) (mem.); but see Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (holding that an abandonment by the trustee during the pendency of a
bankruptcy proceeding is a non-taxable transfer; thus, the bankruptcy estate is not
required to recognize as income the property's built-in gain); Terjen v. Santoro (In re
Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 458 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 30 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (un-
published table decision). For a more in depth discussion of the case law addressing
the tax consequences of abandonments in bankruptcy, see Cecil, supra note 18, at
737-48.
50. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 765-82.
51. Id. at 766.
52. See 1 NAT'L BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS - NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 971 (1997).
53. Id.
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for his fresh start, or abandoned by the trustee because it is burdensome to the
bankruptcy estate.
54
As discussed previously, 5 current law provides that if the bankruptcy
trustee sells appreciated property that is part of the estate, it is the estate, and
not the debtor, that must include the built-in gain inherent in the property in
the estate's gross income.56 In Abandonments in Bankruptcy, I took a position
contrary to this weight of authority, arguing that even if the trustee sells ap-
preciated property for the benefit of unsecured creditors, the debtor should
nonetheless bear the burden of the tax on the appreciation inherent in the
property because again it was the debtor, and not the unsecured creditors,
who enjoyed the pre-bankruptcy benefits of that appreciation. I argued that to
find otherwise could lead to incongruous results. For example, under current
law if the trustee abandons encumbered property back to the debtor, and that
property is later foreclosed upon by the secured creditor to satisfy its claim, it
is the debtor who is responsible for the tax on the gain inherent in that prop-
erty.57 Conversely, if the trustee sells unencumbered property with the same
amount of appreciation for the benefit of unsecured creditors, it is the estate,
and not the debtor, that is responsible for the tax on the same gain.58 Shifting
the tax burden from the debtor to the estate simply because the debtor's credi-
tors hold unsecured rather than secured claims elevates form over substance.
From a policy perspective, I argued that the debtor should bear the tax burden
in both situations because the debtor enjoyed the benefit of the property's
appreciation in both instances.
59
Accordingly, I proposed that both the Tax Code and the Bankruptcy
Code be amended to clarify that the trustee's abandonment of property back
to the debtor or to a secured creditor with a possessory interest in the property
should not constitute a realization event for tax purposes.6° In addition, as
outlined in greater detail below, the debtor's tax liability with respect to the
gain inherent in the abandoned property should not arise until the debtor later
sells or disposes of the property, triggering the realization of gain.6'
54. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 766.
55. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
56. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5852; see also In re Swann, 149 B.R. 137, 146 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993) (mem.);
Waldschmidt v. Comm'r (In re Lambdin), 33 B.R. 11, 12-13 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983) (mem.). It should be noted that this paragraph is taken in substantial part from
Cecil, supra note 18, at 768.
57. See, e.g., Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam).
58. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
59. Id.
60. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 766.
61. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
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B. Treating The Debtor's Gain as Discharge of Indebtedness Income
Although the gain resulting from the sale or disposition of an asset of
the bankruptcy estate should be taxed to the debtor (whether the asset is sold
by the trustee for the benefit of creditors or abandoned by the trustee and later
sold by the debtor or foreclosed upon by a secured creditor), usually the
debtor will not have the cash available to pay the resulting tax because she is
in financial distress. To remedy this problem, in Abandonments in Bankruptcy
the Minnesota article, I proposed that the gain should be treated as discharge
of indebtedness income. 6 2 Following is a brief explanation of the concept of
discharge of indebtedness income.
Section 61 of the Tax Code requires a taxpayer to include in gross in-
come "income from whatever source derived." 63 The Supreme Court has
stated that gross income includes any accession to the taxpayer's wealth. 64
When a taxpayer borrows money, the loan proceeds are not considered gross
income because the taxpayer acquires a corresponding obligation to repay the
borrowed money and, thus, does not have an accession to wealth. 65 If, how-
ever, the taxpayer is relieved of the obligation to repay the borrowed funds,
then the taxpayer must include the discharged debt in her gross income.
66
This concept, referred to alternatively as cancellation of indebtedness income
or discharge of indebtedness income, was first recognized in the landmark
1931 Supreme Court case of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.67 The policy
justification for including discharge of indebtedness in gross income, enunci-
ated by Justice Holmes in Kirby Lumber, was that the taxpayer experienced
an increase in its net worth when its assets were freed up as a result of extin-
guishing its liabilities at a discount.68 Although Kirby Lumber's theoretical
62. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 767-77. In this article I noted that the notion that
this income be treated as discharge of indebtedness income was first proposed by the
National Bankruptcy Conference in 1994. See NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra
note 25, at 89-91. The Conference failed, however, to decide whether the debtor or
the bankruptcy estate should be responsible for this discharge of indebtedness income.
63. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000). Much of the next three paragraphs was taken from
Cecil, supra note 18, at 770-75, although the footnotes have been shortened consid-
erably.
64. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
65. See United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968) ("A loan does not in itself constitute income to the bor-
rower, because whatever temporary economic benefit he derives from the use of the
funds is offset by the corresponding obligation to repay them.").
66. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
67. Id.; see also Haden Co. v. Com'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941) ("As-
sets to the extent of $116,906.54, previously offset by liabilities, were freed from the
claims of creditors, and to this extent the petitioner thereby 'realized within the year
an accession to income."' (quoting Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 2)).
68. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. Commentators have often referred to this pol-
icy justification as the balance sheet approach. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, Rethinking
[Vol. 71
HeinOnline  -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 890 2006
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
underpinnings have been challenged by tax scholars, 69 this net worth ap-
proach is consistent with traditional notions of a comprehensive income tax
base, and the concept of including discharges of indebtedness in gross in-
come is now clearly embedded in the income tax system.71
The Tax Code offers an exception to the harsh tax consequences of this
rule under certain limited circumstances. Section 108(a) of the Tax Code
provides that gross income of a taxpayer does not include as income any
amount that otherwise would be discharge of indebtedness income if the debt
discharge occurs either (i) in a Title 11 bankruptcy proceeding,72 or (ii) while
the taxpayer is insolvent.73 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Tax Act
of 1980 provides that the policy justification for this rule is to "preserve the
debtor's 'fresh start' after bankruptcy... so that a debtor coming out of bank-
the Tax Aspects of Debt Restructuring, 70 TAXES 808, 810 (1992); Katherine Pratt,
Shifting Biases: Troubled Company Debt Restructurings After the 1993 Tax Act, 68
AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 26 (1994).
69. See Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income From the Discharge
of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. REV.
1159 (1978), in which the authors argued that cancellation of debt income, sometimes
referred to as COD income, can be justified not under a net worth or freeing of assets
approach, but rather under a tax benefit theory. "[B]orrowed funds are excluded from
gross income when received because of the assumption that they will be repaid in full
... a tax adjustment is required when this assumption proves erroneous." Id. at 1165
(citing to cases discussing the tax benefit theory); see also Theodore P. Seto, The
Function of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the
Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAX L. REV. 199, 201-06 (1996) (noting that the
Supreme Court has recently adopted both the net worth theory and the tax benefit
rationale for COD income in United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S.
573, 582 (1991)).
70. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of a comprehensive income tax
base, see Cecil, supra note 18, at 750-5 1.
71. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in
Exchange: Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 89, 96 (1984) ("Although the Court's analysis in [Kirby Lumber] ... has been
criticized by commentators, the correctness of the result has rarely been doubted.")
(footnote omitted).
72. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2000). A taxpayer is entitled to rely on the Title 11
exception only if the taxpayer is under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a case
commenced under Title 11 of the United States Code, and "the discharge of indebted-
ness is granted by the court or is pursuant to a plan approved by the court." Id. §
108(d)(2).
73. Id. § 108(a)(1)(B). It should be noted that if this gross income exclusion
applies by reason of the taxpayer's insolvency, section 108(a)(3) provides that the
exclusion will only apply to the extent that the taxpayer is insolvent. Id. § 108(a)(3).
Moreover, insolvency is defined in section 108(d)(3) as "the excess of liabilities over
the fair market value of assets." Id. § 108(d)(3). The determination of insolvency is
made by looking at the taxpayer's assets and liabilities just prior to the debt discharge.
Id.
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ruptcy (or an insolvent debtor outside bankruptcy) is not burdened with an
immediate tax liability. 74
There is, however, a toll exacted from taxpayers in bankruptcy and in-
solvent taxpayers, codified in section 108(b) of the Tax Code. Section 108(b)
provides that the amount excluded from a taxpayer's gross income by reason
of section 108(a) must be applied to reduce the taxpayer's tax attributes in the
following order: net operating losses ("NOLs"), general business credits,
minimum tax credits, capital loss carryovers, the basis of the taxpayer's prop-
erty, passive activity loss and credit carryovers, and foreign tax credit carry-
overs. 75 The Senate Finance Committee explained that the policy underlying
these attribute reduction rules was to allow financially distressed debtors to
defer the income realized from discharge of indebtedness from their gross
income, but not to allow them to exclude such amounts from income forever.
"[Tihe rules of the bill are intended to carry out the Congressional intent of
deferring, but eventually collecting within a reasonable period, tax on ordi-
nary income realized from debt discharge.
' 76
Applying these discharge of indebtedness rules in the abandonment con-
text is best understood through an example. Returning to my earlier example
from the A.J. Lane case,77 assume that a debtor files for bankruptcy protection
owning three apartment complexes with a combined fair market value of $53
million and having an adjusted basis of $13 million. The apartments are en-
cumbered by liabilities of approximately $60 million. The bankruptcy trustee
abandons these complexes to the debtor as unduly burdensome to the bank-
ruptcy estate, because the liabilities to which the properties are encumbered
74. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7025; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9 (1980).
75. I.R.C. § 108(b)(2) (2000). If a taxpayer is required to reduce the basis in her
property under section 108(b)(2)(E), the basis reduction is capped at the amount by
which the adjusted basis of the taxpayer's assets exceeds the aggregate amount of her
liabilities immediately after the debt discharge. See id. § 1017(b)(2). For an in-depth
examination of these tax attribute reduction rules, including the basis reduction limita-
tion, see Paul H. Asofsky, Discharge of Indebtedness Income After the Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1980, 27 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 583, 587-600 (1983); see also Karrie Bercik,
The Tax Consequences of Stock-For-Debt Exchanges, 11 J.L. & COMM. 201, 206-09
(1992). Finally, if the taxpayer has none of the tax attributes enumerated in section
108(b)(2), there are no tax consequences to the debtor's discharge of indebtedness. It
is not included in the debtor's gross income, nor does it carry over to future years to
reduce tax attributes in those years.
76. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7035; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9. This same policy justification was reiterated in
1993, when, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 487-88 (1993), Congress added minimum tax credits and pas-
sive activity loss and credit carryovers to the list of tax attributes to be reduced by the
debtor's discharge of indebtedness.
77. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71
HeinOnline  -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 892 2006
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
exceed their fair market value. Under my proposal, this abandonment will not
be a taxable event to the bankruptcy estate.78
The debtor is in default on the loans; therefore, the secured creditor
seeks relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the apartment complexes,
and that relief is granted by the bankruptcy court. 79 Upon foreclosure, which
is a taxable event, the debtor will realize $40 million of discharge of indebt-
edness income: the difference between the properties' fair market value of
$53 million and their adjusted basis of $13 million. 8° Because the debtor is
under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a Title 11 proceeding, how-
ever, he will not be required to include that $40 million in gross income. In-
stead, the debtor will be required to reduce his tax attributes by the $40 mil-
lion of discharge of indebtedness income. For the sake of simplicity, assume
that the debtor had $60 million of net operating losses before filing for bank-
ruptcy. He would be required to reduce his net operating losses from $60
million to $20 million under the Tax Code's discharge of indebtedness
rules.82 If in the future the debtor has gross income of $80 million, he would
be able to offset that income by only $20 million of net operating losses, re-
sulting in $60 million of taxable income, rather than $60 million of net oper-
ating losses that he had originally accumulated, which would have resulted in
only $20 million of taxable income. Accordingly, the government eventually
obtains its pound of flesh because the debtor has fewer net operating losses
with which to offset his income, resulting in $40 million more taxable in-
come. Not coincidentally, this is the same amount of the debtor's discharge of
indebtedness income.
This tax treatment furthers bankruptcy policy by not burdening the
debtor's fresh start with the imposition of a tax liability at a time when he is
unable to satisfy that liability, while at the same time promoting sound tax
policy by not allowing the appreciation inherent in an asset to go untaxed
simply because a debtor avails himself of the bankruptcy system. There is,
however, one problem with the foregoing example. Under current law, the
debtor does not retain his tax attributes, such as net operating losses, when he
files for bankruptcy.84 Therefore, without a change in the law, the government
would not be able to recoup the tax on discharge of indebtedness income in
the abandonment situation. The third prong of my proposal remedies this
vexing problem.
78. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 2005).
80. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
81. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
82. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(A).
83. This paragraph is taken in large part from Cecil, supra note 18, at 777.
84. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (2000).
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C. Tax Attribute Retention
As stated above, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate succeeds to most of her tax attributes by operation of law, in-
cluding net operating losses, capital loss and tax credit carryovers, charitable
contribution carryovers, passive loss and credit carryovers, the debtor's basis
and holding period of her assets, and the debtor's method of accounting. 85 As
a result of this transfer of tax attributes, the estate can use them to reduce its
tax liability on income earned during the pendency of the bankruptcy estate.
Any unused tax attributes will transfer back to the debtor at the termination of
the estate.86
Under my proposal, because the debtor is taxed on any gain inherent in
an asset as of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, irrespective
of how the property is sold or otherwise disposed of, it should be the debtor,
and not the bankruptcy estate, that should have the benefit of these tax attrib-
utes. Accordingly, the third prong of my proposal argues that the Tax Code
should be amended to allow the debtor to retain the tax attributes that arose
before the filing of his bankruptcy petition.87 These tax attributes can then be
reduced by any discharge of indebtedness income recognized by the debtor
during the bankruptcy proceeding, thereby postponing, but not eliminating,
the debtor's recognition of the gain inherent in the asset at the time of filing.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING TAx ISSUES ARISING POST-PETITION
Abandonments in Bankruptcy dealt almost exclusively with how to treat
the gain inherent in an asset at the time of a debtor's bankruptcy filing for tax
purposes. Although I touched on the issue of post-filing appreciation, I did
not address the issue in any detail. The remainder of this article will expand
on the paradigm set forth in my earlier article and apply it to the issue of how
to treat the gain that accrues with respect to an asset after a debtor files for
bankruptcy protection. 88
A. Taxing Post-Petition Appreciation to the Debtor
To better understand this issue, consider the following example. Be-
cause of poor investment decisions over a number of years, Suzanne is forced
85. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(c), 1.1398-2(c) (1994).
86. I.R.C. § 1398(i).
87. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 779-80.
88. Many of the issues that I address in this section were raised by Gregg Polsky,
an Associate Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, and by John
Dethman, Research Librarian and Coordinator of Access Services for the University
of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. I thank them for raising these important fol-
low-up issues.
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to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection on February 1, 2006. At the time
of filing, Suzanne owns Greenacre, an unimproved parcel of land worth
$250,000. She purchased the land for $50,000 a number of years ago and has
made no improvements to it. Greenacre becomes property of Suzanne's bank-
ruptcy estate by operation of law.89 Thus, at the time of filing, there is a
$200,000 gain built into Greenacre. Shortly after Suzanne files her bank-
ruptcy petition, a national real estate developer announces that a massive
shopping center complex will be built on a large tract of land adjacent to
Greenacre, and the value of Greenacre immediately increases to $400,000.
My earlier proposal provides that Suzanne should be responsible for the
$200,000 of pre-petition appreciation inherent in Greenacre, irrespective of
whether the trustee abandons the property or sells it for the benefit of credi-
tors and that the $200,000 gain should be treated as discharge of indebtedness
income to the debtor.9° But what about the $150,000 of post-petition appre-
ciation inherent in Greenacre? Should that gain also be taxed to Suzanne as
discharge of indebtedness income, or should it instead be taxed to her bank-
ruptcy estate?
In Abandonments in Bankruptcy I proposed that the post-petition gain be
taxed to the debtor and treated as discharge of indebtedness income if the
property was abandoned to the debtor by the trustee or retained by the debtor
as exempt property. 91 I also argued that the post-petition gain be taxed to the
bankruptcy estate if the trustee sold the asset for the benefit of creditors.
92
However, I have since reconsidered this earlier proposal, and believe that
sound tax policy dictates that the debtor should be taxed on the post-
appreciation gain inherent in an asset even if the trustee sells the asset for the
benefit of unsecured creditors, thus fully extending my original proposal to
apply to all post-petition appreciation in an asset. I posit two arguments in
support of this change of position.
First, as stated earlier, traditional notions of tax policy dictate that the
taxpayer who enjoys the benefits of an asset's appreciation in value should
bear the burden of the tax attributable to that appreciation. 93 Clearly, when the
89. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
90. See supra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
91. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 780-81.
92. Id. at 781. Outside the tax context, cases have held that post-petition appre-
ciation that accrues to an asset when it is part of the bankruptcy estate becomes part of
the estate by operation of section 541(a)(6), which provides that "[p]roceeds, product,
offspring, rents or profits of or from property of the estate" are property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see also In re Reed, 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991).
Similarly, post-petition appreciation that accrues in property abandoned to the debtor
becomes property of the debtor. See In re Womell, 70 B.R. 153, 155 (W.D. Mo.
1986); In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). These cases, however,
offer no assistance in determining which party should be taxed on the post-petition
appreciation.
93. See NAT'L BANKR. REviEw COMM'N, supra note 52, at 970-71.
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debtor retains an asset through an exemption for her fresh start, she will enjoy
the benefits of all appreciation inherent in the property, whether that apprecia-
tion accrues before or after the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition.
Similarly, when the trustee abandons property back to the debtor as burden-
some to the bankruptcy estate, it is the debtor who enjoys the benefits of
property's post-petition gain and, accordingly, it should be the debtor who is
responsible for the tax on that gain. But does the debtor enjoy the benefits of
an asset's post-petition appreciation in value if the trustee sells that property
for the benefit of creditors? I argue that the debtor is benefiting more directly
from the asset's post-petition appreciation than are the creditors for several
reasons. First, if the debtor originally borrowed money to purchase the prop-
erty, which is almost always the case, the debtor received the borrowed funds
on a tax-free basis,94 and the proceeds from the sale of the property by the
trustee will be used, at least in part, to pay off that borrowing. Yet even if an
asset is unencumbered by liabilities, the proceeds from the sale of that asset,
including the post-petition appreciation inherent in that asset, will be used to
pay off the debtor's unsecured creditors. This, too, primarily benefits the
debtor, because she received goods or services from her unsecured creditors,
again on a tax-free basis, and all of the asset's appreciation is being used to
pay those creditors.
There is a second and more pragmatic argument for taxing the debtor on
an asset's post-petition gain regardless of whether it is sold by the trustee or
abandoned to the debtor. From a tax perspective, the results will be identical
whether the gain is taxed to the debtor or to her bankruptcy estate. To under-
stand this phenomenon, return to the Greenacre example from the beginning
of the section.95 If Greenacre is now worth $400,000 and has an adjusted ba-
sis of $50,000, there is a $350,000 gain inherent in the property (partly attrib-
utable to pre-petition appreciation and partly attributable to post-petition ap-
preciation). If the debtor is taxed on all of the gain, she will have $350,000 of
discharge of indebtedness income and will be required to reduce her tax at-
tributes by that amount.96 Conversely, if the estate is taxed on the $150,000 of
post-petition appreciation inherent in Greenacre, it will be required to include
that amount in income and will pay taxes on that gain. Assume, for ease of
calculation, that the tax rate is twenty percent; therefore, the estate will pay
taxes of $30,000 on the post-petition gain when the trustee sells Greenacre.
That $30,000 tax liability reduces the assets available for distribution to the
estate's unsecured creditors. If the estate has $30,000 less in assets available
94. See, e.g., United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) ("A
loan does not in itself constitute income to the borrower, because whatever temporary
economic benefit he derives from the use of the funds is offset by the corresponding
obligation to repay them.").
95. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
96. It is important to remember that current law does not treat this gain as dis-
charge of indebtedness income; rather, the proposal that I set forth in my Minnesota
article establishes this tax treatment. See Cecil, supra note 18, at 765-80.
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for unsecured creditors, then the debtor will have $30,000 more of her debt
discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. This discharged debt will increase
the debtor's discharge of indebtedness income by a like amount, with a corre-
sponding reduction in the debtor's tax attributes.97 Thus, at the conclusion of
the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor will have exactly the same amount of
discharge of indebtedness income irrespective of whether the post-petition
appreciation in the debtor's assets is taxed to the debtor or to her bankruptcy
estate. The only parties affected by taxing the debtor instead of the estate are
the debtor's unsecured creditors. For these reasons, I propose that my original
paradigm for taxing the debtor on all appreciation inherent in an asset, irre-
spective of whether that asset is abandoned by the trustee, retained by the
debtor for her fresh start, or sold by the trustee for the benefit of creditors, be
extended to any appreciation accruing after the debtor files for bankruptcy.
B. Treating Post-Petition Appreciation as Discharge of
Indebtedness Income
The previous section established that all post-petition appreciation
should be taxed to the debtor; however, the issue that remains is whether all
of the resulting gain should be treated as discharge of indebtedness income,
as I have proposed should be the case with pre-petition appreciation. As was
necessary with the previous section, we must examine the myriad situations
in which this issue might arise in order to determine the proper tax conse-
quences to be ascribed to each event.
Consider first the situation in which Greenacre, above, has built-in gain
of $350,000 and is unencumbered by liens. The bankruptcy trustee sells
Greenacre for the benefit of unsecured creditors. Under my proposal, the
debtor is responsible for the full $350,000 gain, even though that gain is at-
tributable to both pre- and post-petition appreciation. In this case, all of the
debtor's gain should be treated as discharge of indebtedness income and,
because the debtor is under the jurisdiction of a court in a Title 11 bankruptcy
proceeding, the debtor should be entitled to defer the recognition of that in-
come by reducing her tax attributes by the $350,000 discharge of indebted-
ness amount.
In a second scenario, assume that Greenacre is encumbered by a lien in
the amount of $400,000, the full fair market value of the property. Clearly the
trustee will abandon Greenacre back to the debtor as burdensome to the bank-
ruptcy estate. Under my proposal, the act of abandonment is not a taxable
event. 9 Title to Greenacre revests in the debtor, as if the estate had never
97. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(1) (2000).
98. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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owned the property. 99 Further assume that the debtor is hopelessly in default
on her loan, and the secured creditor seeks and obtains relief from the auto-
matic stay to foreclose on Greenacre, which it does. 1°° Because foreclosure is
a taxable realization event, the debtor now has income equal to the difference
between her adjusted basis in the property, $50,000, and the amount of the
loan that is satisfied in the foreclosure, which we will assume is the full
amount of $400,000. Thus, the debtor has a $350,000 gain on the foreclosure.
Should this gain also be treated as discharge of indebtedness income? This
article proposes that it should, because again the debtor is under the jurisdic-
tion of the court in a bankruptcy proceeding at the time that the foreclosure
occurs. Thus, the debtor will be required to reduce her tax attributes by the
$350,000 discharge of indebtedness amount recognized on the foreclosure of
Greenacre.
It is the third scenario that raises more difficult interpretive issues with
respect to whether the discharge of indebtedness rules should apply to post-
petition appreciation. This scenario arises when the post-petition appreciation
is not recognized for tax purposes until after the termination of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. For example, in the previous scenario the secured creditor
foreclosed on Greenacre while the bankruptcy proceeding was still pending.
Should the result be different if the judge refused to lift the automatic stay, so
that the secured creditor did not foreclose on Greenacre until after the termi-
nation of the proceeding? Under existing law, the discharge of indebtedness
rules for bankruptcy proceedings apply only while the debtor is under the
jurisdiction of a court in a Title 11 proceeding.! °1 Thus, under current law the
result in this scenario would be different than in the preceding one, and the
debtor would be required to recognize the $350,000 of gain as income at the
time of the foreclosure.
102
Because the substance of the transactions in scenarios two and three is
indistinguishable, and the only fact differentiating the two is when the fore-
closure occurs, I contend that they should be treated alike for tax purposes.
Accordingly, the debtor should have $350,000 of discharge of indebtedness
income when the secured creditor forecloses on Greenacre at the termination
of the bankruptcy proceeding, and she should be entitled to reduce her tax
attributes by a like amount.
99. See, e.g., In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 653 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991) (citing Ma-
son v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 163 (1977), affTd, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (per cu-
riam)).
100. For the grounds for seeking relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy, see
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 2005).
101. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
102. It should be made clear at this juncture that in the previous scenario the gain
would only be treated as discharge of indebtedness income because my paradigm
treats it as such; current law does not go that far, and only treats discharged debt as
discharge of indebtedness income. It does not treat gain from the sale or disposition of
property, even in a bankruptcy proceeding, as discharge of indebtedness income.
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The final scenario raises the most difficult interpretive issues, however.
In this final scenario, assume that the debtor and the secured creditor enter
into a reaffirmation agreement with respect to the loan securing Greenacre
10 3
(or that the debtor is not in default on the loan and the ride through option has
survived BAPCPA'°4), Thus, the creditor does not foreclose on the property
either during the bankruptcy proceeding or immediately after it terminates.
The debtor remains current on her loan payments for a number of months
after bankruptcy, and the value of Greenacre rises to $500,000. She then suf-
fers a series of financial reversals, fails to make several loan payments in a
row, and the secured creditor forecloses on Greenacre to satisfy its loan.
Should the debtor still be entitled to treat the gain as discharge of indebted-
ness income and, if so, should it include all of the gain inherent in the prop-
erty (now $450,000), or merely the $350,000 gain inherent in the property at
the termination of the bankruptcy case?
The purpose of allowing the debtor to treat gain on the sale or disposi-
tion of an asset as discharge of indebtedness income, thereby availing himself
of the Title 11 exception to the discharge of indebtedness rules and postpon-
ing the recognition of gain, is to further the debtor's fresh start in bankruptcy.
Therefore, it seems incongruous to allow the debtor to continue to use that
exception many years after the bankruptcy proceeding has terminated, simply
because the property at issue was once part of the bankruptcy proceeding. Yet
to draw a bright line and suggest that the discharge of indebtedness exception
is unavailable to a debtor after bankruptcy also leads to incongruous results,
as scenarios two and three above demonstrate (foreclosure during or immedi-
ately after the bankruptcy proceeding). Accordingly, this article proposes a
concept similar to an "exit tax," which is currently being proposed for expa-
103. For the requirements for entering into a reaffirmation agreement, see 11
U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) (Supp. V 2005).
104. Ride-through allows a debtor who is current on his secured debt to neither
redeem the collateral securing the debt nor reaffirm the debt, but instead allows the
debtor to retain the property securing the debt by continuing to make timely payments
on the debt. Whether the Bankruptcy Code permitted ride-through prior to the enact-
ment of BAPCPA was subject to contentious debate among the circuits. See, e.g., In
re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 (3d Cir. 2004) (permitting ride-through); Capital Comm.
Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (per-
mitting ride-through); but see Bank of Boston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843, 849
(1st Cir. 1998) (limiting debtor's options to redemption or reaffirmation and rejecting
the ride-through option); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (limit-
ing debtor's options to redemption or reaffirmation and rejecting the ride-through
option).
Although Congress intended to put an end to the ride-through option in
BAPCPA, there is considerable debate over whether it was successful in doing so. For
a comprehensive discussion of the ride-through option both before and after
BAPCPA, see Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms For Hold-
ing on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 457, 474-82 (2005).
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triates who renounce their United States citizenship and move to another
country. 1
05
Under this proposal, just before a debtor's bankruptcy estate is termi-
nated, the bankruptcy judge will value all of the debtor's property that still
remains in the bankruptcy estate or that has been abandoned back to the
debtor.10 6 Any gain inherent in that property will be treated as discharge of
indebtedness income at the time of the valuation (there will be a fictional sale
to creditors for the property's fair market value). 107 Yet because the debtor
remains under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the discharge of in-
debtedness income will not be taxed to the debtor currently, but will instead
reduce his tax attributes by a like amount. Moreover, the amount treated as
discharge of indebtedness income must increase the debtor's basis in his asset
producing that income, so that the gain is not taxed again to the debtor when
he later sells or disposes of that asset. 108 This proposal will allow all pre-
petition gain inherent in an asset upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
together with all post-petition gain accruing to an asset during the pendency
of the proceeding, to be treated as discharge of indebtedness income, irre-
spective of when the realization event with respect to that property occurs. At
the same time, it recognizes that a line must be drawn, so that if the debtor
retains an asset after the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding, he cannot
105. See, e.g., H. 4297, 109th Cong. § 442 (2006) (generally taxes expatriates as
having sold all of their assets at fair market value immediately prior to expatriation,
and taxes them on the gain or loss immediately, without regard to other provisions of
the Tax Code, such as otherwise applicable non-recognition provisions).
106. This proposal requires the bankruptcy judge to engage in a second valuation
proceeding for all estate property. It can be criticized as adding additional expense to
the bankruptcy process. Yet the cost of not doing so is to allow a debtor to treat too
much income as discharge of indebtedness income, thereby reducing tax revenue in
the long run. Accordingly, whenever a proposal attempts to harmonize competing tax
and bankruptcy policies, the additional costs on one side (here, the valuation proceed-
ings) must be weighed against the additional benefits on the other (here, increased tax
revenue).
107. Under the Tax Code, there are a number of instances in which there is a fic-
tional sale of property at its fair market value for tax purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§
311(b)(1), 336(a) (2000). Moreover, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
proposed a similar concept when it suggested that if a trustee abandons property dur-
ing the administration of a bankruptcy proceeding, it should be treated as a disposition
of the property by the debtor immediately before bankruptcy. See NAT'L BANKR.
REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 52, at 970. While the proposal in this article differs from
the Commission's suggestion that there be a deemed sale of the abandoned property at
the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding because it suggests a deemed sale at the
conclusion of the proceeding, the concept of a deemed sale remains the same in both
proposals.
108. There are numerous examples in the Tax Code that allow a taxpayer to in-
crease the basis in her assets by gain recognized, in order to prevent that gain from
being taxed again. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1)(B)(ii), 1031(d).
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avail himself of the discharge of indebtedness exception forever, simply be-
cause the property was at one time property in the debtor's bankruptcy estate.
Accordingly, gain accruing after the termination of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing will be taxed to the debtor upon the sale or disposition of the property
under normal tax principles. 
109
To illustrate this proposal, return one final time to the Greenacre exam-
ple. Assume that the property is subject to a $400,000 lien, and therefore the
trustee has abandoned the property back to the debtor. The property has in-
creased in value to $400,000 at the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding,
and the judge values it at $400,000. The debtor has entered into a reaffirma-
tion agreement with the secured creditor and thus retains Greenacre. At the
termination of the proceeding, the debtor will have $350,000 of discharge of
indebtedness income (the fair market value of $400,000, which is the amount
realized on a fictional sale of the property to creditors, less Greenacre's ad-
justed basis of $50,000). The debtor will not be required to include that
$350,000 in gross income, but instead will decrease her tax attributes, such as
her net operating losses and capital loss carryovers, by $350,000. She will be
entitled to increase her basis in Greenacre by the amount of discharge of in-
debtedness income so that she is not required to pay tax on that gain again
when she ultimately sells or disposes of Greenacre. Thus, its basis is in-
creased by $350,000 to $400,000. If Greenacre appreciates another $100,000
in value before the debtor sells it (or it is foreclosed on by the secured credi-
tor), that $100,000 gain will be taxed to the debtor as gross income, just as
with any other sale or disposition.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the most exciting aspects of legal scholarship is engaging in
scholarly debate with other academics. This article is the result of one such
debate. Although the three-pronged proposal to solving the abandonments
problem that I outlined in Abandonments in Bankruptcy created a strong
foundation for resolving the issue, it required further analysis. This article
goes one step further and considers the issue of how to treat post-petition
appreciation in an asset for tax purposes when a debtor has availed herself of
the bankruptcy process. Together,. these articles attempt to propose a para-
digm to be applied to the abandonments issue that will harmonize competing
tax and bankruptcy policies and ultimately improve the bankruptcy system.
109. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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